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Abstract. A simple and quick general test to screen for numerical
anomalies is presented. It can be applied, for example, to electoral
processes, both electronic and manual. It uses vote counts in officially
published voting units, which are typically widely available and institu-
tionally backed. The test examines the frequencies of digits on voting
counts and rests on the First (NBL1) and Second Digit Newcomb–
Benford Law (NBL2), and in a novel generalization of the law under
restrictions of the maximum number of voters per unit (RNBL2). We
apply the test to the 2004 USA presidential elections, the Puerto Rico
(1996, 2000 and 2004) governor elections, the 2004 Venezuelan pres-
idential recall referendum (RRP) and the previous 2000 Venezuelan
Presidential election. The NBL2 is compellingly rejected only in the
Venezuelan referendum and only for electronic voting units. Our origi-
nal suggestion on the RRP (Pericchi and Torres, 2004) was criticized by
The Carter Center report (2005). Acknowledging this, Mebane (2006)
and The Economist (US) (2007) presented voting models and case stud-
ies in favor of NBL2. Further evidence is presented here. Moreover,
under the RNBL2, Mebane’s voting models are valid under wider con-
ditions. The adequacy of the law is assessed through Bayes Factors (and
corrections of p-values) instead of significance testing, since for large
sample sizes and fixed α levels the null hypothesis is over rejected. Our
tests are extremely simple and can become a standard screening that
a fair electoral process should pass.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Newcomb–Benford Law (NBL) postulates
that the frequency of significant digits follow a dis-
tribution quite different from the Uniform (see Tab-
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les 1–2), as originally discovered by Newcomb (1881)
and Benford (1938).
Although the NBL works for any vector of signif-
icance numbers, we will use the marginal and joint
distributions of the first or second digits to check
the law. Our goal is to develop methods for initial
scrutiny of officially published electoral data. Offi-
cial counts (published by the state electoral author-
ity) are presented in quite variable levels of aggre-
gation. We call an “electoral unit” the officially re-
ported, less aggregated data unit. The composition
and size of these units vary widely in different elec-
tions. The data may be aggregated at county lev-
els (USA) or reported at an elementary polling unit
when no aggregation is performed (Venezuela). If re-
sults are reported from polling machines of around
400 voters or fewer, the frequency distribution of the
first digit of votes counts is heavily affected. On the
other hand, the frequency of second digits should be
less affected. That is why testing the second digit
frequency, although less natural and less powerful
than testing the first digit, is of wider applicabil-
ity. Our main proposal is to check the second digit
Newcomb–Benford Law NBL2 (also known as 2BL)
or a variation of it by taking into account upper re-
strictions RNBL2. However, in cases where the offi-
cial data is aggregated, as in USA national electoral
data, the first, and even the joint first and second
distribution, fit the data extremely well; see Sec-
tion 4.
The Carter Center was one of the foreign institu-
tions which oversaw the Venezuelan 2004 Presiden-
tial Referendum, and was accepted as a monitor-
ing external referee by both the government and the
opposition; see http://www.cartercenter.org/
homepage.html. In the Carter Center Report (2005),
pages 132–133, our novel suggestion to use the Sec-
ond Digit NBL to scrutinize the Venezuelan 2004
Referendum was criticized on the following 3 grounds:
(1) The law is characteristic of scale invariant data
with specific units, like centimeters or kilograms,
so presumably it should not apply to elections and
vote counts. The Newcomb–Benford Law has a sim-
ple justification for numbers which have units, like
weights, distances, temperatures, dollars or science
constants, on which scale invariance apply; see, for
example, Pietronero, Tosatti and Vespignani (2001).
However, for unit-less data, like number of votes,
a mathematically well grounded justification exists
for using the law. It is based on a series of now clas-
sical contributions by Hill (1995, 1996), that were
summarized in Statistical Science. Hill establishes
that NBL holds asymptotically if the numbers are
generated as unbiased mixtures of different popula-
tions, and the more mixing, the better the approx-
imation. For example, if we generate numbers from
a Normal distribution or from a Cauchy distribu-
tion, NBL will be followed more closely in the lat-
ter because the Cauchy distribution is a scale mix-
ture of Normal distributions. Mixtures of Cauchy
distributions may lead to an even better fit of NBL
(Raimi, 1976). Reciprocally, if the NBL is rejected,
then the vote counts are suspect of not being an
unbiased realization of numbers sampled from mix-
tures of distributions. How to implement this test
is the subject matter of our method. (2) A second
criticism was empirical: “First digit of precinct-level
electoral data for Cook County, the city of Chicago,
and Broward County, Fla. depart significantly from
Benford’s Law, primarily because of the relatively
constant number of voters in voting precincts.” But
this criticism is about the distribution of first dig-
its, and not the distribution of second digits. For low
levels of aggregation of votes, we proposed the sec-
ond digit distribution (or a generalization), precisely
because of the limits in the number of voters that
produces “. . .relative constant number of voters in
voting precincts.” The second digit is far less sensi-
tive to constant numbers of voters per polling unit.
Compliance with the law based on the first digit is
to be expected only for greater levels of aggregation,
as, for example, in the USA 2004 election on which
both the first and second digit laws show impres-
sive fit; see Section 4.1. It should also be emphasized
that the results toward NBL are asymptotical in na-
ture, and we require a substantially large numbers
of votes to claim a reasonably asymptotic situation,
which, only perhaps for the Chicago data, can be
claimed among the cases listed by the Carter Cen-
ter Panel. From an empirical point of view, in this
paper we show several elections (with larger data
sizes) with good fit to NBL (see Section 4), where
compliance with the law is the norm rather than
the exception. There is a rapidly increasing num-
ber of contributions in which compliance and vi-
olations of the NBL have been presented for elec-
toral votes; see Pericchi and Torres (2004), Mebane
(2006, 2007a, 2007b), Torres et al. (2007) and But-
torff (2008) among others. (3) A final criticism, rai-
sed by the panel appointed by the Carter Center,
was that under some (perhaps over simplistic) elec-
toral models, computer simulations did not yield fre-
quencies of second digits in accordance with NBL2.
The fact that for some mathematical models NBL2
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is not observed may also be regarded as evidence of
the lack of realism of such models, and more sophis-
ticated idealizations ought to be searched. In Tay-
lor (2005, 2009) (who was part of the Carter Center
Panel) a very intriguing and brief discussion is made
of the Newcomb–Benford law regarding elections.
The claim is made that the NBL is of “little use
in fraud detection” for elections. However, the ra-
tionalization covers only the first digit NBL and not
the second digit. Data is simulated from models that
can be criticized for not being realistic, since real-
istic population voting models should not be homo-
geneous on each electoral unit, but should be mix-
tures of different populations (see next paragraph).
The claim seems to be that the results of the simula-
tions contradict NBL for the first, second and third
digit laws. However, no measures of fit are provided,
and intriguingly, the figures that cover the second
and third digits have only 9 entries, although there
are 10 second and third digits. (See Taylor, 2005,
Figure 8, page 23, Technical Report version Novem-
ber, 7, 2005). Furthermore, for the second digit at
least, the fit of the votes for and against the govern-
ment appear to be markedly different, a fact that is
not discussed in the cited Technical Report.
The negative criticism of the Carter Center Panel
did not convince everybody. Acknowledging our orig-
inal suggestion and the Carter Center Report, Wal-
ter Mebane presented an invited conference at the
Annual Meeting of the American Association for
the Advancement of Science which was reported in
The Economist (US) (2007), on which the suggestive
term “Election Forensics” was coined by Mebane.
He provides further support to the use of the 2nd
digit NBL (calling it 2BL) for an initial quick scrutiny
of elections based solely on officially reported data
on the current election and does not require the use
of covariates (Mebane, 2006). Mebane produced sim-
ulations from realistic models of electorate behavior
which are consistent with the 2nd digit NBL, and
also presented different types of frauds that are de-
tected by tests on the 2nd digit NBL (although not
all frauds are detected). His models are an inter-
esting reflection of political behavior, which are hi-
erarchical mixed population models, denoted here
HMPM. In these models there are two populations
of voters at each polling station: the partisan popu-
lation strongly in favor of a candidate and the gen-
eral population, swinging between candidates. There
was, however, a question about the general applica-
bility of the 2nd digit Law: Mebane’s models pro-
duce frequencies according to NBL2 for some num-
bers of voters per unit, say, 2000 or 3000 voters
per electoral unit, but not for others, say, 2250. We
introduced the Restricted Newcomb–Benford Law
(RNBL) in Torres Nu´n˜ez (2006), before being aware
of Mebane’s models. It turns out that the RNBL2 is
consistent generally with Mebane’s models, which is
illustrated in Table 4.
The NBL1 has been utilized before to check, for
example, tax fraud (Nigrini, 1995), and microarrays
data corruption (Torres Nu´n˜ez, 2006). Its use for
elections is timely, since electronic voting is raising
fresh concerns about the possibility of massive inter-
ference with the digital data (Pericchi and Torres,
2004).
The official electoral data, when not presented
with levels of aggregation, may have a small up-
per bound, namely, the number of potential voters.
In that respect, when necessary, we proceed in two
ways: (1) Check the second digit number Law in-
stead of the first, because the second digit is far less
affected, if at all by restrictions on the total; (2) If
(1) fails, try the restricted second digit law RNBL
with realistic upper bounds; see next section. If both
fail, then the alarm is on and further study is re-
quired.
The empirical general picture that emerges is that
the fit of NBL is accepted in the elections in USA in
Puerto Rico and in the manual elections in Venezuela.
(In USA 2004, even the first digit and the more com-
plex joint first and second digit test accepts NBL
without restrictions). Electronic voting in Venezuela,
in the recall referendum, however, fails the test and,
to some extent, in the previous presidential elec-
tions, adding to the suspicions about electronic vot-
ing, particularly without universal paper checking
and audits, prior to the sending of the data to the
central polling station.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is
devoted to the description of the law and a gener-
alization. Section 3 discusses different methods, al-
ternative to the use of p-values to judge the fit of
the models. Section 4 presents the data analysis of
the USA, Puerto Rico and Venezuelan elections and
Venezuelan recall referendum. Section 5 states some
conclusions.
2. OVERVIEW ON THE
NEWCOMB–BENFORD FRAMEWORK
Intuitively, most people assume that in a string of
numbers sampled randomly from some body of data,
the first nonzero digit could be any number from 1
through 9, with all nine numbers being equally prob-
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Table 1
Newcomb–Benford Law for the first significant digit
Digit unit 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Probability 0.301 0.176 0.125 0.097 0.079 0.067 0.058 0.051 0.046
able. Empirically, however, it has been found that
a law first discovered by Newcomb and later popu-
larized by Benford is ubiquitous.
For the first and second digit Newcomb–Benford
Laws we have discrete probability distribution val-
ues presented in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively,
which are quite different from the Uniform Distri-
bution.
The most general probabilistic justification of the
NBL is in Hill (1996).
Hill developed the probability theory that justifies
the asymptotic validity of the law for data such as
people counts, which do not have units like grams
or meters.
The aim here is to use and generalize the New-
comb–Benford Law in order to apply it to wider
classes of data sets, particularly arising from elec-
tions and to verify their fit to different sets of data
with Bayesian statistical methods.
The general definition of the Newcomb–Benford
Law is stated here, on base 10, for simplicity. First
we introduce the simpler laws for the first and sec-
ond significant digits. Let D1,D2, . . . denote the sig-
nificant digit functions. For example, D2(0.154) = 5
gives the second significant digit:
pB1 (d1) = Prob(D1 =First significant digit = d1)
= log10(1 + 1/d1), d1 = 1,2, . . . ,9,
pB2 (d2) = Prob(D2 = Second significant digit = d2)
=
9∑
j=1
log10(1 + 1/(10j + d2)),
d2 = 0,1, . . . ,9.
For all positive integers k, all d1 ∈ {1, . . . ,9} and
dj ∈ {0,1, . . . ,9} for j = 2, . . . , k the joint Newcomb–
Benford distribution is
pB1,...,k(d1, . . . , dk) = Prob(D1 = d1, . . . ,Dk = dk)
= log10
[
1 +
1∑k
i=1 di · 10
(k−i)
]
.
In the remainder of this section we postulate the
way in which the N–B Law acts under restrictions,
when the number of electors per electoral unit is re-
stricted to be smaller than a relatively small and
known number K. This may be important when of-
ficial data have not been aggregated. The notation
used in the following discussion is:
1. pBi (di) is the Newcomb–Benford Probability Dis-
tribution for the digit i and number di. These
are presented in Table 1 and Table 2 for the first
(i= 1) and second significant digit (i= 2) respec-
tively.
2. pCi (di) under the constraint N ≤K is the propor-
tion of the numbers with ith-digit equals to di in
the set of numbers that are smaller or equal to
K, that is, pCi (di) =
♯di≤K
K
, where ♯di ≤K is the
cardinality of numbers with ith-digit equal to di
that are no bigger than K;
3. pUi (di) the proportion of numbers with ith-digit
equal to di if no constraints were present.
Note that if there is no restriction, then pC = pU .
However, if K = 800, for example, then for the first
significant digit, pB1 (d1 = 2) = 0.176 (see Table 1),
pC1 (d1 = 2) =
111
800 and p
U
1 (d1 = 2) =
1
9 .
Definition 2.1. The Restricted N–B Law
(RNBL) distribution is
pi(di|N ≤K) =
pBi (di)p
C
i (di)/p
U
i (di)∑
d′
i
pBi (d
′
i)p
C
i (d
′
i)/p
U
i (d
′
i)
.(2.1)
Table 2
Newcomb–Benford Law for the second significant digit
Digit unit 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Probability 0.120 0.114 0.109 0.104 0.100 0.097 0.093 0.090 0.088 0.085
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Table 3
NBL for first and second digit with and without an upper restriction of 800
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
NB1 0.301 0.176 0.125 0.097 0.079 0.067 0.058 0.0512 0.046
CNB1800 0.330 0.193 0.137 0.106 0.087 0.073 0.064 0.006 0.005
NB2 0.120 0.114 0.109 0.104 0.100 0.097 0.093 0.090 0.088 0.085
CNB2800 0.121 0.114 0.109 0.104 0.100 0.097 0.093 0.090 0.087 0.085
The heuristics behind the RNBL is as follows:
sample from sets of numbers that obey NBL, but
reject the number if and only if it does not obey
the restriction. Note that if pCi ≡ p
U
i , then the usual
Newcomb–Benford Law (NBL) is recovered, whether
there is a restriction or not. Take as an example the
first digit law. If the numbers are restricted to be
less than or equal to K = 9, there is no correction
to the NBL. But if K = 15, say, a substantial cor-
rection applies. Note also that the restricted rule is
also valid for lower bound restrictions of the form
N ≥K or even for two sided restrictions.
For positive numbers, there is a simpler expression
for the equation above in terms of the cardinality of
the sets induced by the restriction. It turns out that
pUi (d
′
i) = constant (the constant is equal to 1/9 for
the first digit and to 1/10 for the second digit). This
fact allows to cancel out pUi in (2.1). Now let ♯di ≤K
be the number of positive numbers less than or equal
to K, with the ith-significant digit equal to di. We
may now simplify (2.1) as follows:
pi(di|N ≤K) =
pBi (di)p
C
i (di)/p
U
i (di)∑
d′
i
pBi (d
′
i)p
C
i (d
′
i)/p
U
i (d
′
i)
canceling pUi = c
=
pBi (di)p
C
i (di)∑
d′
i
pBi (d
′
i)p
C
i (d
′
i)
=
pBi (di)♯{di ≤K}/K∑
d′
i
pBi (d
′
i)♯{d
′
i ≤K}/K
canceling K
=
pBi (di)♯{di ≤K}∑
d′
i
pBi (d
′
i)♯{d
′
i ≤K}
.
This is a simpler expression easier to calculate.
Comment 1. In Table 3 we calculated the re-
stricted law with an upper bound of 800. There it is
seen that the first digit is more affected by the con-
straint than the second digit, illustrating that the
Table 4
Table with an upper bound of N = 2250 voters,
that illustrates the better fit of the restricted law,
over m= 999 simulations
m P (H0|data) p-values P (H0|data)
No restrictions 999 0.9996 0.001 0.018
Restrictions 999 1.0000 0.802 > 0.5
second digit NBL is of wider applicability than the
first digit NBL.
Mebane (2006, 2007a, 2007b) introduced realistic
models (HMPM models) of electoral behavior that
produced frequencies consistent with the NBL2 for
some numbers of electors per unit, like 2000, but not
for other such as 2250.
Table 4 displays a large simulation with expected
maximum number of voters of 2250 which shows
the second digit RNBL to be more consistent with
HMPM models than the usual second digit NBL, as
anticipated.
3. CHANGING P -VALUES TO NULL
HYPOTHESIS PROBABILITIES
The p-value is the probability of getting values
of the test statistic as extreme as or more extreme
than the value actually observed given that the null
hypothesis is true. For the first significant digit, the
observed chi-squared statistic χ2
Observed
is given by
χ2Observed
(3.1)
= Sample size×
9∑
d=1
(Prob(D1 = d)− fd)
2
Prob(D1 = d)
,
where fd is the proportion observed of the digit d
as the first significant digit. For the second signifi-
cant digit, D2 = d ∈ {0,1, . . . ,9}. This is the basis of
a classical test of the null hypothesis which is that
the data follows the Newcomb–Benford Law. If the
null hypothesis is accepted, the data “passed” the
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test. If not, a sort of inconsistency has been found
which opens the possibility of manipulation of the
data. In the electoral process the null hypothesis
is H0 :The data is consistent with the Newcomb–
Benford proportions for the second significant digit
(in Table 2), while the alternative H1 means that
there is an inconsistency with the law. It is impor-
tant to get a quantification of the evidence in fa-
vor of the Null Hypothesis. In our case, if the data
obeys Newcomb–Benford’s Law, then the test offers
no basis to suspect undue intervention in the elec-
toral process.
There is a well known statistical misunderstand-
ing between the probability that the null hypothesis
is true and the p-value. One general way to calibrate
p-values is through the Universal Upper Bound, due
to Sellke, Bayarri and Berger (2001). For a null hy-
potheses, H0, we have
Pval = Prob(χ
2
ν ≥ χ
2
Observed | null hypothesis is true),
where ν is the degrees of freedom, which is equal to 8
for the first significant digit and 9 for the second and
onward. If the p-value is small (Ex. p-values < 0.05
or less), it is assumed, based on uncritical practice
and convention, that there is a significant result.
But the p-value is not the probability that the sam-
ple arose from the null hypothesis and, therefore, it
should not be interpreted as a probability. The use-
fulness and interpretation of a p-value is drastically
affected by the sample size.
A useful way to calibrate a p-value, under a Ro-
bust Bayesian perspective, is by using the bound
that is found as the minimum posterior probability
of H0 that is obtained by changing the priors over
large classes of priors under the alternative hypoth-
esis. If a priori we have equal prior probabilities for
the two hypotheses, P (H0) = P (H1) = 1/2, and for
pval < e
−1, then
P (H0|Pval)
(3.2)
≥ 1/(1 + [−e · pval · loge(pval)]
−1).
A full discussion about this matters can be found in
Sellke, Bayarri and Berger (2001).
It is more appropriate to report the Universal Lo-
wer Bound (3.2) than the p-value, with respect to
the goodness of fit test of the proportions in the ob-
served digits versus those proportions specified by
the Newcomb–Benford Law. As we can see in Ta-
ble 5, the correction is quite important. This table
shows how much larger this lower bound is than the
p-values. Small p-values (i.e., pval = 0.05) imply that
Table 5
p-values in terms of Hypotheses
probabilities
pval P (H0|data)
0.05 0.29
0.01 0.11
0.001 0.0184
the posterior probability of the null hypotheses is at
least 0.29, which is not very strong evidence to reject
a null hypothesis.
However, the lower bound correction does not de-
pend on sample size, so for large sample sizes it
can be very conservative. For a full correction of
p-values, a Bayes Factor is needed, with the corre-
sponding posterior probability of the null hypothe-
sis. Next we compute a very simple Bayes Factor,
based on a Uniform prior.
3.1 Posterior Probabilities with Uniform Priors
Let Υ1 = [1,2, . . . ,8,9] and Υ2 = [0,1, . . . ,8,9].
The elements that may appear when the first digit
is observed are members of Υ1 and if we observe the
second digit or higher, the observations are members
of Υ2. Let
Ω0 =
{
p1 = p01, p2 = p02, . . . ,
pk = p0k
∣∣∣ k∑
i=1
p0i = 1
}
for k = 1, . . . ,9 in the case of the first digit and k =
0,1, . . . ,9 for the second digit. Then our hypothesis
can be written as
H0 =Ω0,
H1 =Ω
′
0,
(3.3)
where Ω
′
0 means the complement of Ω0. In other
words,
Ω
′
0 = {pi 6= p0i for at least one i ∈Υ}.
As the simplest objective prior distribution assume
an uniform prior for the values of the p′is, then
πu(p1, p2, . . . , pk) = constant =Γ(k)
(3.4)
= (k− 1)!,
which is the correct normalization constant, as it is
seen from the well-known integral
∫
Ω dp1 · · ·dpk−1 =
1/Γ(k).
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We can write the posterior probability of H0 in
terms of the Bayes Factor. Let x be the data vector,
then the Bayes Factor is
B01 =
P (H0|x)P (H1)
P (H1|x)P (H0)
.(3.5)
If we have nested models and P (H0) = P (H1) =
1
2 ,
then the Bayes Factor reduces to
B01 =
P (H0|x)
P (H1|x)
,(3.6)
where
P (H0|x) =
B01
B01 +1
.(3.7)
For the ith significant digit, the data vector is n=
(n1, n2, . . . , nk), where nd is the frequency with
which d is the ith significant digit in the data. Us-
ing the definition of a Bayes Factor with a simple
hypothesis, we have
B01 = f(n1, . . . , nk|Ω0)
/
(∫
Ω
′
0
f(n1, . . . , nk|Ω
′
0)
· πU (p1, . . . , pk)dp1 · · · dpk−1
)
,
with
∑
i∈Υ pi = 1 and pi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Υ. Substituting
our assumptions,
B01
=
n!∏k
i=1 ni!
k∏
i=1
pnii0
/(
(k− 1)!
∫ +∞
−∞
n!∏k
i=1 ni!
·
k∏
i=1
pni+1−1i dp1 · · · dpk−1
)
.
After canceling factorial terms and using the iden-
tity∫ +∞
−∞
k∏
i=1
pni+1−1i dp1 · · · dpk =
∏k
i=1Γ(ni+ 1)
Γ(n+ k)
,
we obtain a simplified expression for B01,
B01 =
pn110p
n2
20 · · ·p
nk
k0
(k− 1)!
∏k
i=1Γ(ni+1)/Γ(n+ k)
.(3.8)
To obtain the posterior probability using the Bayes
Factor (using 3.7) and substituting B01, we get
P (H0|x)
= pn110p
n2
20 · · ·p
nk
k0/
(
(k− 1)!
∏k
i=1Γ(ni +1)
Γ(n+ k)
)
(3.9) /(
pn110p
n2
20 · · ·p
nk
k0
/
(
(k − 1)!
∏k
i=1Γ(ni+ 1)
Γ(n+ k)
)
+ 1
)
.
In Torres Nu´n˜ez (2006), calculations of posterior
probabilities with several other priors and approxi-
mations are presented. The conclusions are similar
to those presented here. [See Berger and Pericchi
(2001) for priors and approximations in Bayesian
Models Selection].
4. RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS
We illustrate the use of the First and Second digit
Newcomb–Benford Law with data from the 2004
USA elections, three elections in Puerto Rico and
the Presidential Recall referendum in Venezuela and
one previous Presidential election in that country.
We denote by NB1 and NB2 the analysis according
to the first and second digit NBL, respectively. We
show in the tables the value m which denotes the
number of electoral units, and the median number
of votes for the respective candidate on the infor-
mation units. There is wide variation on the aggre-
gation of the numbers, with the USA case as the
most aggregate, and Venezuela the least aggregate.
That is the reason why the first digit law is obeyed
only in the USA, and the fit is remarkable. In most
cases, the second digit law is also obeyed, without
the need to use the restricted NBL. The case in
which the NBL2 was overwhelmingly violated is pre-
sented by the Venezuelan Presidential recall vote.
We attempted to mend it by restricting the Law for
various plausible upper bounds, but the fit did not
improve.
4.1 United States Elections 2004
The first case in point is the 2004 USA presidential
election, Tables 6 and 7 and Figures 1–7. The data
at the level of counties can be found at http://
us.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/.
(Note: Nader’s votes had to be constructed from
alternative sources.) This is one of the best case
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Table 6
Summary USA 2004 Elections
United States 2004 Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
Bush votes 2 1816 5047 18380 14130 1076000
Kerry votes 3 973.2 3225.0 16840.0 9156.0 1908000
Nader votes 1 13 31 143.7 85 13251
Table 7
USA 2004 Elections
United States 2004 m Median P (H0|data) p-values P (H0|data)
NB1 Bush votes 4715 3694 1.000 0.003 0.050
NB1 Kerry votes 4714 2603 1.000 0.002 0.034
NB1 Nader votes 2822 8 1.000 0.833 > 0.5
NB2 Bush votes 4708 3713 1.000 0.068 0.331
NB2 Kerry votes 4698 2621 1.000 0.651 > 0.5
NB2 Nader votes 2271 44 1.000 0.830 > 0.5
studies we know about the inadequacy of p-values
when compared to the impressive fit of the NBL with
both the first and the second digit, and even with
the joint density of first and second digit. For ex-
ample, in the case of Bush’s votes, for the first digit
the fit is excellent, but the p-value is only 0.003,
significant even at 0.01 level. On the other hand,
the absolute minimum of posterior probabilities of
the null hypothesis is 0.05, over sixteen times the
p-value. Note that this is only a lower bound over
all possible prior distributions, which is certainly un-
derstating the true evidence. Not surprisingly, a real
Bayes Factor leads to a posterior probability of al-
most one.
The best fit is Nader’s votes, which is not signif-
icant, neither for the first or the second digit NBL,
and so not surprisingly, the posterior probabilities
of compliance with NBL is one. Bush’s and Kerry’s
votes first digit tests are significant with small p-
values, but the posterior probabilities are virtually
Fig. 1. Empirical distributions of the first two digits of the presidential candidates vs. N–B Law for the first two digits.
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Fig. 2. Bush’s digit proportions vs N–B Law for the 1st
digit.
Fig. 3. Kerry’s digit proportions vs. N–B Law for the 1st
digit.
one. For the second digit law the fit in all these cases
is excellent. This is illustrated by Figures 1–7.
4.2 Puerto Rico
Here we show the data for the three main parties
(PNP, PPD and PIP) in the 1996, 2000 and 2004
elections for governor. The data can be found at
http://electionspuertorico.org/datos/2004
and http://www.ceepur.org/elecciones2000/.
The results about the first digit are significant.
Moreover, the posterior probabilities also reject the
NBL1. The restricted NBL for the first digit does
not show a big improvement either. This may be
due to the fact that in electoral processes, the up-
Fig. 4. Nader’s digit proportions vs N–B Law for the 1st
digit.
Fig. 5. Bush’s digit proportions vs. N–B Law for the 2nd
digit.
per bounds (the total number of electors per polling
station) is not typically fixed across the population
of polling stations. However, the second digit shows
an excellent fit to the NBL2 Law, and the results
with restrictions do not change much, illustrating
again that the effect of bounds in the second digit
is usually smaller than for the first digit NBL.
4.3 Venezuela
4.3.1 Referendum The 2004 Presidential Revoca-
tory Referendum inVenezuela has attracted consider-
able interest and controversy. (Data from the Refe-
rendum can be found at http://www.cne.gob.ve,
http://www.venezuela-referendum.com, https://
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Fig. 6. Kerry’s digit proportions vs. N–B Law for the 2nd
digit.
Fig. 7. Nader’s digit proportions vs. N–B Law for the 2nd
digit.
sites.google.com/a/upr.edu/probability-and-
statistics/data-files-1, http://esdata.info/
2004.)
One of the most interesting features of this process
is that it was partly manual and partly electronic,
with the majority of the polling stations having elec-
tronic voting, but a sizeable proportion being man-
ual. Here, NO means in favor of the President and
SI against.
The most salient feature is that the electronic NO
votes give evidence against NB2 Law. Figure 11 shows
that the second digits seem to be Uniformly dis-
tributed. This is not the case for manual votes, or
for the SI electronic votes. This finding is quite in-
Table 8
Results of the 1996 Governor Elections in Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico
1996 m P (H0|data) p-values P (H0|data)
NB2 PNP 1836 1.000 0.554 > 0.5
NB2 PPD 1839 1.000 0.138 0.426
NB2 PIP 1466 1.000 0.104 0.390
Table 9
Results of the 2000 Governor Elections in Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico
2000 m P (H0|data) p-values P (H0|data)
NB2 PNP 1823 1.000 0.979 > 0.5
NB2 PPD 1878 1.000 0.436 > 0.5
NB2 PIP 1579 1.000 0.450 > 0.5
Table 10
Results of the 2004 Governor Elections in Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico
2004 m P (H0|data) p-values P (H0|data)
NB2 PPD 1924 1.000 0.154 0.440
NB2 PND 1917 1.000 0.538 > 0.5
NB2 PIP 1402 1.000 0.822 > 0.5
formative: The electronic votes in favor of the gov-
ernment need closer scrutiny.
4.3.2 Venezuela 2000 For comparison purposes
the Venezuelan presidential election of 2000 (the
presidential election previous to the recall referen-
dum of 2004) is presented here. (Data can be found in:
https://sites.google.com/a/upr.edu/probability-
and-statistics/data-files-1, http://esdata.
info/downloads/ELECCIONES2000.zip.)
Here none of the candidates for either manual
or electronic show compelling evidence against the
NB2 Law, although the winning electronic voting
results in a posterior probability smaller than the
others. Although to a lesser extent than in the 2004
referendum, this result may indicate the need for
a closer scrutiny of the winning electronic votes.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusions to be reached here are as
follows:
1. At a technical level: (i) the RNBL is a substan-
tial generalization of the NBL that enlarges its
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(a) Puerto Rico Elections 1996 PNP Party.
(b) Puerto Rico Elections 1996 PPD Party.
(c) Puerto Rico Elections 1996 PIP Party.
Fig. 8. Puerto Rico 1996 Elections compared with the New-
comb–Benford Law for the second digit.
(a) Puerto Rico Elections 2000 PNP Party.
(b) Puerto Rico Elections 2000 PPD Party.
(c) Puerto Rico Elections 2000 PIP Party.
Fig. 9. Puerto Rico 2000 Elections compared with the New-
comb–Benford Law for the second digit.
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(a) Puerto Rico Elections 2004 PNP Party.
(b) Puerto Rico Elections 2004 PPD Party.
(c) Puerto Rico Elections 2004 PIP Party.
Fig. 10. Puerto Rico 2004 Elections compared with the New-
comb–Benford Law for the first digit.
Fig. 11. Venezuela Revocatory Referendum Electronic NO
Votes proportions. Venezuela Revocatory Referendum Elec-
tronic Votes Proportions compared with the Newcomb–Ben-
ford Law’s proportions for Second digit. This is the only com-
pelling rejection of the NBL2 law.
Fig. 12. Venezuela Revocatory Referendum Electronic SI
Votes proportions. Venezuela Revocatory Referendum Elec-
tronic Votes Proportions compared with the Newcomb–Ben-
ford Law’s proportions for Second digit.
domain of applications. However, in the electoral
processes presented here, the differences in the
results with and without the restriction did not
change much. This may be due to the fact that
there is no constant upper bound, since the total
number of electors is not the same for all polling
stations. However, it is the case that the second
digit law is far less affected by restrictions than
the first digit law. (ii) The second digit NBL2 is
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Fig. 13. Venezuela Revocatory Referendum Electronic NO
Votes proportions. Venezuela Revocatory Referendum Manual
Votes Proportions compared with the Newcomb–Benford Law’s
proportions for Second digit.
Fig. 14. Venezuela Revocatory Referendum Electronic SI
Votes proportions. Venezuela Revocatory Referendum Man-
ual Votes Proportions compared with the Newcomb–Benford
Law’s proportions for Second digit.
a useful test for quick detection of anomalous be-
havior in electronic or manual elections. (iii) The
Universal Lower Bound and even more so, Bayes
Factors, are appropriate measures of evidence of
the fit to the law, and p-values are not, particu-
larly for large data sets like the electoral data.
2. Regarding the detection of anomalies: (i) the USA
2004 elections show a remarkable fit to the first
digit Newcomb–Benford Law, and also to the sec-
ond digit NBL. All the manual elections show
support for the second digit NBL law. (ii) On the
Fig. 15. Venezuela 2000 Election Electronic Votes in favor
of the Winner compares with Newcomb–Benford Law’s pro-
portions for Second digit.
Fig. 16. Venezuela 2000 Election Manual Votes proportions
in favor of Winner compares with Newcomb–Benford Law’s
proportions for Second digit.
other hand, the electronic results of the votes in
favor of the NO in the Recall Referendum violate
the NB2 law. This is surprising, since the man-
ual votes in favor and against, as well as the elec-
tronic votes in favor of the opposition, fit the law
reasonably well. In the previous 2000 Venezuelan
presidential elections, there is no compelling ev-
idence against the law, although again the elec-
tronic results in favor of the winner show only
about 13% of posterior probability in favor of the
law.
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Table 11
Results of the 2004 Presidential Recall Referendum in Venezuela for electronic votes
Venezuela RR m Median P (H0|data) p-values P (H0|data)
No Electronic NB2 19064 263 0.000 0.000 0.000
Si Electronic NB2 19063 172 1.000 0.024 0.196
Table 12
Results of the 2004 Presidential Recall Referendum in Venezuela for Manual votes
Venezuela RR m Median P (H0|data) p-values P (H0|data)
No Manual NB2 4556 190 1.000 0.155 0.440
Si Manual NB2 4379 76 1.000 0.003 0.047
Table 13
Results of the 2000 Election in Venezuela for electronic votes
Venezuela 2000 m Median P (H0|data) p-values P (H0|data)
Winner Electronic NB2 6876 486 0.129 0.000 0.000
Runner up Electronic NB2 6872 265 1.000 0.017 0.160
Table 14
Results of the 2000 Election in Venezuela for manual votes
Venezuela 2000 m Median P (H0|data) p-values P (H0|data)
Winner Manual NB2 3540 103 1.000 0.366 > 0.5
Runner up Manual NB2 3219 52 1.000 0.006 0.081
Fig. 17. Venezuela 2000 Election Electronic Votes propor-
tions of the Loser compares with Newcomb–Benford Law’s
proportions for Second digit.
Fig. 18. Venezuela 2000 Election Manual Votes proportions
of the Loser compares with Newcomb–Benford Law’s propor-
tions for Second digit.
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Our methods, particularly the use of the Second
Digit Newcomb–Benford Law, add to the increas-
ing literature on measures of surprise and legitimate
suspicion on electoral processes, particularly but not
restricted to electronic voting. The NBL2, since our
original suggestion in 2004, is becoming a standard
tool on what has been termed by Mebane as “Elec-
tion Forensics.”
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